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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 05-8WD-4070 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - ATCS/FCL

REVISION: 0 12/02/97

PART DATA

PART NAME VENDOR NAME PART NUMBER **VENDOR NUMBER**

LRU : PANEL L2A1

V070-730273

SRU :RELAY, 2 THROW HYBRID

MC455-0135-0002

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

RELAY K1, AUTOMATIC CONTROL CIRCUIT, FREON LOOP BYPASS VALVE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:

K1

K2

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2

TWO

FUNCTION:

RELAY PROVIDES AC POWER TO THE BYPASS VALVES IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE IN THE BYPASS DIRECTION ONLY.

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-6WD-4070-02

REVISION#:

0

12/16/97

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - ATCS/FCL

LRU: PANEL L2A1

ITEM NAME: RELAY, HYBRID (DOUBLE THROW)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE CLOSURE, SHORTS CONTACT-TO-

CONTACT.

MISSION PHASE:

LO LIFT-OFF

OO ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY 104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING

ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) PASS

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

IF THE RELAY FAILS CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE WILL SWITCH TO RAD BYPASS WHICH CAN BE DETECTED AND OVERRIDDEN BY THE MANUAL SWITCH.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS .

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6WD-4070-02

RELAY K1 (STARBOARD) (OR K2 PORT) FAILS CLOSED WILL CAUSE STARBOARD ISOLATION VALVE MOTORS TO BE POWERED CONTINUOUSLY WHICH CAN BE FIXED BY SETTING SWITCH S26 TO MANUAL.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

NONE.

(C) MISSION:

PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION AFTER 2 FAILURES:

- (1) RELAY K1 STARBOARD (OR K2 PORT) FAILS CLOSED CONTINUOUSLY ENERGIZING MOTORS IN STARBOARD (OR PORT) ISOLATION VALVE THUS SETTING IT TO RAD BYPASS POSITION.
- (2) SWITCH \$26 FAILS IN AUTO POSITION (CANNOT GO TO MANUAL) RESULTING IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO MANUALLY SWITCH TO RAD FLOW THEREBY LOSING RADIATOR COOLING FOR THAT COOLANT LOOP.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

FOUR FAILURE SCENARIO:

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER 4 FAILURES:

- (1) RELAY K1 STARBOARD (OR K2 PORT) FAILS CLOSED CAUSING CONTINUOUS ENERGIZING OF ISOLATION VALVE MOTORS SETTING VALVE TO RAD BYPASS POSITION WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF RADIATOR COOLING FOR THAT LOOP AND POSSIBLE MANUAL SWITCHING OF \$28 STARBOARD (OR \$27 PORT) TO RAD FLOW POSITION TO INCREASE VEHICLE COOLING
- (2) EXTERNAL LEAK IN ASSOCIATED RADIATOR ARRAY
- (3) S28 STARBOARD (OR S27 PORT) FAILS IN RAD FLOW POSITION (CANNOT BE SWITCHED TO RAD BYPASS) CAUSING LOSS OF FREON FOR ASSOCIATED COOLANT LOOP THROUGH RADIATOR RUPTURE.
- (4) LOSS OF REDUNDANT COOLANT LOOP CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VEHICLE COOLING.

FOUR FAILURE SCENARIO:

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER 4 FAILURES:

- (1) RELAY K1 STARBOARD (OR K2 PORT) FAILS CLOSED CAUSING CONTINUOUS ENERGIZING OF ISOLATION VALVE MOTORS SETTING VALVE IN RAD BYPASS POSITION WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF RADIATOR COOLING FOR THAT LOOP
- (2) EXTERNAL LEAK IN ASSOCIATED RADIATOR ARRAY
- (3) \$26 FAILS IN TO AUTO POSITION (CANNOT BE SWITCHED TO MANUAL)
 CAUSING LOSS OF FREON IN THAT COOLANT LOOP THROUGH RADIATOR RUPTURE WITH
 RESULTANT LOSS OF COOLANT LOOP
- (4) LOSS OF REDUNDANT COOLANT LOOP CAUSING LOSS OF ALL VEHICLE COOLING
- (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

SEE SECTIONS C AND D ABOVE.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6WD-4070-02

- APPROVALS D. F. MIKULA E. K. E. RYAN D. SOVEREIGN E. L. PHAN Maneik Cettre 11-74-98

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